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ABSTRACT
Firms sometimes write price lists or catalogs for their exports, so they set prices for a period of time
and do not adjust prices during that interval in response to changes in their environment. The firm
sets the price either in its own currency or the importer's currency. This paper draws a simple link
between the choice of currency, and the pricing decision of a firm that changes prices in response
to all shocks. Specifically, if the latter firm's price has a lower variance in terms of its own currency
than the importer's currency, then the firm with a price list will set the price in its own currency (and
otherwise it will set price in the foreign currency.) This relationship is established by consideration








cengel@ssc.wisc.edu  Exporting firms frequently have price lists or catalogs for their exported products.  The 
price is set for an interval of time, and does not respond to changes in the environment (such as 
changes in demand or production costs) during that period.  Firms typically set a price either in 
their own currency or the importer’s currency.  An extensive literature has investigated the 
optimal currency of price setting.
1 
  A related literature examines the optimal export price.  In some of the literature, the firm 
is assumed to respond to all shocks that might influence its price.
2  Another strand of the 
literature assumes that export prices are set for a period of time, and examines the factors that 
influence the price (with the currency of invoicing given, rather than chosen optimally.)
3 
  Here we draw a link between the literature on currency of price setting and the literature 
in which firms can choose their price with knowledge of all shocks.  In the latter case, if the 
variance of the export price in the firm’s own currency is less than the variance of the price in the 
local currency of the importer, we say this firm’s price exhibits “producer currency stability 
(PCS)”.  If the opposite relationship holds, the firm’s export price exhibits “local currency 
stability (LCS)”.  Now suppose the firm faces the same environment, but must set a price prior to 
knowledge of the shocks.  The main theorem of this paper is:  It is optimal for the firm to set its 
price in its own currency – “producer currency pricing (PCP)” – under precisely the conditions in 
which the firm would be PCS if its price responded freely to shocks.  The exporter will set price 
                                                 
1   Baron (1976), Giovannini (1988), Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991), Friberg (1998), Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard 
(2004), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002, 2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2004b), and Goldberg and Tille (2004) are 
examples.   
2   Krugman (1987), Dornbusch (1987), Baldwin (1988), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Marston (1990), Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Bergin (2003), Goldberg and Campa (2004), and Corsetti and 
Dedola (2004) are examples. 
3  Examples include Feenstra (1989), Feenstra and Kendall (1997), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2002), Bergin and Feenstra (2001), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004a). 
  1in the importer’s local currency – “local currency pricing (LCP)” – if and only if the firm would 
be LCS if its price were freely adjusted.
4 
  The proof of this result also draws some interesting links.  A firm that chooses between 
PCP and LCP is a special case of a firm that chooses the optimal index of its export price to the 
exchange rate.  The PCP firm changes its export price (in the importer’s currency) one-for-one 
with the exchange rate, while the LCP’s export price (in the importer’s currency) does not 
change at all with the exchange rate.  More generally, we consider a firm that indexes the log of 
its export price to the log of the exchange rate with an affine function.  We show that the slope 
coefficient in this index function is equal to the slope coefficient from regressing the log of the 
export price on the log of the exchange rate for the firm that adjusts its price freely to all shocks 
(not just to the exchange rate.)  This result is used as a lemma in the proof of the main theorem.
5 
  There are perhaps three ways to view the contribution of this paper.  First, from a 
prescriptive standpoint, the main theorem in this paper might simplify the problem of a firm 
trying to decide between invoicing in its own currency or the importer’s currency.  The literature 
that examines theoretically how exchange rate changes should pass-through to export prices can 
be applied to choosing a currency for pricing.  For example, it has been shown that exchange rate 
pass-through should be low when demand becomes more elastic as the price rises, when 
substantial costs are incurred in the importer’s currency, when the destination market is highly 
competitive, etc.  Under these same conditions, setting the price in the importer’s currency will 
be optimal. 
                                                 
4   This result is demonstrated using a second-order approximation of the firm’s objective function under 
uncertainty.  Friberg (1998) also links the invoicing literature to the price-setting literature.  This paper generalizes 
Friberg’s result in a way that is clarified below. 
5   Corsetti and Pesenti (2004a) build a general equilibrium model in which firms index to exchange rates, but the 
degree of indexation is taken as given.  Corsetti and Pesenti (2004b) and Goldberg and Tille (2004) build models in 
which the degree of indexation is chosen optimally.  Tille’s note to me linking an earlier version of this paper to 
Goldberg and Tille (2004) is what led me to the lemma described here.  Tille’s note shows that the relationship in 
the lemma holds in the model of Goldberg and Tille (2004). 
  2  The second contribution is to clarify the links between the literature on pass-through, and 
the literature on currency of pricing.  Such a clarification might be particularly useful in the 
context of some macroeconomic models.  In a large class of macro models, business cycle 
behavior is driven by nominal price stickiness.  It is the slow adjustment of nominal prices that 
leads monetary shocks to have real effects in these models, for example.  But the behavior of the 
macroeconomy depends on whether firms are PCP or LCP.
6  Several recent macroeconomic 
papers have endogenized the currency of pricing in different settings,
7 but the main theorem in 
this study might help organize these findings.  
  Third, the main theorem provides a caution in interpreting empirical work on the 
relationship between exchange rates and prices.  The theorem suggests that without further 
refinement, finding that prices do not respond much to exchange rates is difficult to interpret 
either as support or contradiction for the notion that nominal prices are “sticky”.  This warning 
cuts both ways.  Export prices may respond very little to exchange rate changes even when firms 
are free to adjust their prices continuously.  That is, the firms might be LCS, not LCP.  
Conversely, empirical confirmation of models in which there is LCS could also be interpreted as 
evidence of LCP.  For example, some recent studies have found support for models of firms with 
freely-adjustable prices in which local distribution services are an important part of the cost of 
exported goods.
8  The studies conclude that the local-currency stability of the price of these 
distribution services is a major explanation for local currency stability of export prices.  Our 
theorem says that under these same conditions, if export prices cannot be adjusted in response to 
shocks, they should be set in the local-currency price.  Without a more detailed study of the 
                                                 
6   This point has been emphasized especially by Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004a). 
7   In particular, see Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002, 2003), Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2004b), and Goldberg and Tille (2004). 
8  For example, Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), Burstein, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo (2002), and Goldberg and Camap (2004). 
  3adjustment of prices to distinguish the two types of models, the evidence could be consistent 
with either LCS or LCP.
9 
  As Friberg (1998) has pointed out, exporting firms do not reset prices at the same 
frequency as asset markets reset exchange rates.  In some sense, Friberg argues, the models in 
which prices are set in advance must be the ones that are relevant in determining the effects of 
exchange rates on export prices.  But for macroeconomic models, the relevant distinction is not 
whether goods prices change as quickly as asset prices, but whether the slow adjustment of 
goods prices is relevant for understanding the business cycle.  While the model presented here is 
static, it suggests that the same factors that determine pass-through in a sticky-price setting 
influence pass-through in a flexible-price setting.  Then a careful study of the dynamics of price 
adjustment is needed to determine whether price adjustment is slow enough to play a significant 
role in macroeconomic adjustment.  A snapshot of the pass-through elasticity cannot determine 
this. 
 
1.  Models of Export Pricing 
  We consider the price setting decision for a monopolistic firm that sells in a single 
foreign market.  First we take the case in which the firm can choose the price for its product with 
full information about demand, costs, etc.  The firm sets a nominal price for its product in order 
to maximize profits denominated in its own currency.  Because prices can respond fully to all 
information (that is, there is no price stickiness), finding the optimal nominal price and optimal 
real price are equivalent problems, and it is irrelevant whether the objective function is stated in 
                                                 
9  Examples of empirical studies that have explicitly allowed for both slow nominal price adjustment and incomplete 
long-run pass-through are Marston (1990) and Goldberg and Verboven (2005). 
  4real or nominal terms.  It is helpful, however, to express these in nominal terms to facilitate 
comparison later with models in which prices are set without full information on the state. 
  The firm chooses  , the log of the foreign currency price of its export to maximize the 
twice-differentiable concave profit function 
* p
(* ,) p π x .  x is a vector of variables that affect the 
firm’s profits but are exogenous to the firm.  This vector might include the exchange rate. 
  The first-order condition is: 
(1)  (* ,) 0 p p π = x . 
Linearize this function around  = xx , where x is the mean of x, and  * pp * =  , where   is the 
value of   that satisfies 
* p 
* p (* ,) 0 p p π = x  .  We get: 
(2)  (* ,)(* * ) (* ,)( ) 0 pp px pp p p π π ′ ⋅− + ⋅ − = xx   x x , 
where   (* ,) px p π x   is a vector whose ith element is 
2 (* ,) * i pp π x ∂ ∂∂ x .  Alternatively, equation 
(2) is the first-order condition for choosing p* to maximize a second-order approximation 
(around x and  ) of the objective function.
10  * p 






















where   is the optimal value of p* for this firm.  The unconditional pass-through elasticity – 
the coefficient in the projection of   on s (the log of the exchange rate expressed as the home 






















                                                 
10   Specifically, the second-order approximation (using  (* ,) 0 p p π = x ) is given by 
{ }
2 (* ,) (* ,) (* ,) ( ) . 5 (* ,) (* * ) ( ) (* ,) ( ) 2 (* * ) (* ,) ( ) xp p x x p x pp p p p p p p p p πππ π π π ′′ ≈+ − + − + − − + − − x x xxx x xx x xx xxx      ′  
  5where the ith element of the vector   is equal to the coefficient in the projection of xi on s.  xs b
  Now set aside this case in which the firm can set its price with knowledge of all the 
components of x, and turn to the case in which the firm must set its price without knowledge of 
any components of x.  Suppose, though, that the firm can commit to setting p* as an affine 
function of s:   0 * p ps β =+.  The firm is assumed to maximize a second-order approximation of 
the profit function, discounting profits by the factor D.  The expansion is around D (the mean of 
D), and x and   defined above:  * p 
{ }
2
(* ,) (* ,) (* ,)( ) (* ,)(* * ) (* ,) ( )
. 5 (* ,)(* * ) ( ) (* ,) ( ) 2 (* * ) (* ,) ( )
px
pp xx px
ED p D p p E D D D p E p p D p E
DpE p p D E p D E p p p
ππ π π π
ππ π
′ ≈+ − + − +
′′ +− + − − + −
xx x x x x
xx x x x x x
  






(* ,) xx p π x   is a matrix whose ijth element is 
2 (* ,) ij px π x ∂ ∂∂ x .  All of the first order terms in this 
expansion drop out, because  () 0 ED D −= ,  () 0 E − = xx , and  (* ,) 0 p p π = x  .  Simplifying, 
dropping the constant term, and then dropping D which multiplies all remaining terms, we can 
write the objective as: 
(5) 
2 (* ,)(* * ) ( ) (* ,) ( ) 2(* * ) (* ,) ( ) pp xx px pE p p E p E p p p ππ π ′′ −+− − + − − xx x x x x x     x x  
Notice that the discount factor has completely disappeared from the approximated 
objective function.  This arises from a fairly general assumption about D – that it is exogenous 
for the firm, and so not a function of the firm’s price.  For example, if the firm is simply 
maximizing real profits (in terms of purchasing power of the firm’s owners), then D is the 
inverse of the consumer price index for the firm’s owners.  But firm owners might be risk averse, 
so D could be the marginal utility of an increment to profit denominated in the currency of the 
exporter.  In short, this objective for the firm holds under a variety of possible assumptions about 
the objectives of the firm managers and the structure of asset markets and possibilities for 
  6hedging.  The assumption that D is exogenous to the firm does rule out some possibilities, 
however.  Suppose a single household owns the firm, and the owner-manager discounts profits 
by marginal utility.  The outcome for the firm might directly affect the level of consumption of 
the owner, and thus the marginal utility.  The assumption that D is exogenous to the firm would 
be violated.  An exogenous discount factor is more sensible when, for example, there are many 
owners of the firm, and there are many other sources of income for each owner.  Thus our 
assumption of an exogenous discount factor is violated in the models of Feenstra and Kendall 
(1997) and the model of risk-averse firm owners in Friberg (1998), who assume in essence that 
firm owners’ only income is from profits (so that the firm maximizes the expected utility of 
profits.) 
Replacing p* with  0 p s β + , we find the first-order conditions for choosing  0 p  and β , 
respectively: 
0 ˆ (* ,)( * ) 0 pp pE ps p πβ +− = x  , 
0 ˆ (* ,) ( * ) (* ,) ( ) 0 pp px pE s ps p p E s πβ π ′ +− + −= xx   x x , 
where  ˆ β  is the value of β  that maximizes the objective.  From the first condition, we have 
0 ˆ * p sp β =− + .  Substitute into the second condition to get: 
  ˆ (* ,) ( ) (* ,) ( ) 0 pp px pE s s s p E s βπ π ′ −+ −= xx  x x . 
Solving for  ˆ β , we find 
(6) 
(* ,)cov( , ) ˆ















Comparison of equations (4) and (6) immediately gives us: 
  7Lemma  The unconditional pass-through elasticity when prices are set flexibly,  , equals the 
exchange-rate elasticity of the import price index, 
* ps b
ˆ β . 
Intuitively, a firm that can commit to set the log of the price as a linear function of the log 
of the exchange rate operates exactly like a firm that can observe the exchange rate when setting 
its price.  If that firm can observe only s, and not other elements of x, then it will form its optimal 
linear forecast of   by taking the projection of   on s.  So the indexing firm in essence is a 
flexible-price firm that must set   as a linear function of s and nothing else. 
ˆ * p ˆ * p
ˆ * p
We can now consider the more realistic case of a firm that must set a price for export 
either in its own currency, or the currency of the importer.  This firm can be thought of as 
choosing an index function,  0 p s β + , but with only two choices of β , 0 or -1.  If  0 β = , the 
export price is constant in the foreign currency, so the firm is local-currency pricing (LCP).    If 
1 β =− , the price is constant in the producer’s currency, so the firm is producer-currency pricing 
(PCP). 
The main theorem draws a link between the choice facing this firm, and the firm that can 
set price with full knowledge of x.  For the full-knowledge firm, we say there is local-currency 
price stability (LCS) when the variance of the price in the importer’s currency is less than the 
variance in the producer’s currency:  var( *) var( * ) pp s < + .  In the opposite situation, there is 
producer-currency price stability (PCS). 
Theorem:  When a firm must set its price in advance and choose between LCP or PCP, it 
chooses LCP under exactly the same conditions in which the firm that prices with full 
information has LCS pricing.  Likewise, the firm that sets price in advance chooses PCP if and 
only if the full-information firm chooses PCS pricing. 
  8Proof:  The objective function of the firm that sets price in advance is continuous in β .  Because 
the function is quadratic, it is symmetric around its unique maximum point,  ˆ β ,  given in 
equation (6).  Because the quadratic function is continuous, strictly concave and symmetric, the 
value of the objective function is higher for  0 β =  than for  1 β = −  (so LCP is preferred) when 
, and PCP is preferred when  ˆ 0.5 β >− ˆ 0.5 β < − . 
 But  if  ˆ , then from the Lemma,  .  This implies 
.  Add 
0.5 β >− 0.5 ps b >−
ˆ (* ,) 0 . 5 () 0 Cov p s Var s +⋅ > ˆ 0.5 ( *) Var p ⋅  to each side of this inequality, and we get 
, which is equivalent to  , 
the condition for LCS.    
ˆˆ 0.5 ( *) ( *, ) 0.5 ( ) ( *) Var p Cov p s Var s Var p ⋅+ + ⋅ > ˆ ˆˆ (* ) (* ) Var p s Var p +>
■
  An alternative interpretation of the theorem, which is evident from the proof, is that the 
invoicing firm will choose LCP when the unconditional pass-through elasticity is less than one-
half for the full-information price-setter.  So, the firm that sets its price in advance will choose 
zero pass-through exactly in the case in which the firm that sets prices freely allows only low 
unconditional pass-through.  Conversely, the pricing-in-advance firm chooses PCP, and hence a 
pass-through elasticity of one, under the same conditions that the full-information firm chooses 
high unconditional pass-through (elasticity greater than one-half.) 
 
2.  Discussion 
  As an example,
11 consider a firm that faces a demand curve, 
* ()
D YG P Z N = .    is the 
foreign currency price of the firm’s product,  Z is a price index of products that are substitutes for 
our firm’s product, and N represents other factors that shift demand.  We assume that the product 
* P
                                                 
11  This example is worked out in great detail in an earlier draft of this paper, Engel (2003). 
  9is produced using two variable inputs: one local and one foreign.  The local input might be labor 
used to produce the product, and the foreign input might be foreign labor used to distribute the 
product, or to assemble imported intermediate goods into final products.  The cost function takes 
the form:  ,    .  
*
12 () ( , ) CY HW S W ⋅ 0 C′> C′ ′  may be positive or negative.
12  Y refers to output for 
the firm.  We assume   is homogeneous of degree 1.   , is the home-currency nominal 
unit factor costs for the home input.    is the cost of the foreign-currency price of the foreign 
input.  S is the home currency cost of foreign currency.   
(.,.) H 1 W
*
2 W




(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 )
() pz n w sw
ε δγ γ δ γ ω γ ω γ +− − − −−
=+ + − +
∆∆ ∆ ∆
, 
where lower case letters are the logs of their upper-case counterparts.  Here, we have 
* PG ZG γ ′ ≡−  (the elasticity of demand for the product), 
* ' PZ ε γ ≡ γ  (the elasticity of the 
elasticity of demand),  CYC δ ′′ ′ ≡  (a measure of concavity or convexity of the cost function), 
11 HW H ω ≡  (factor 1’s share of costs), and  1( 1 ) γ εδ γ γ ∆ ≡− ++ −.
13 
  We have from this equation that   is given by:  * ps b
  *
1 2 *
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) (1 )
ps z s n s w s ws bb b bb
ε δ γγ δγ ωγ ω γ ωγ +− − − −− −
=+ + + −
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
. 
It follows that PCP is optimal when 
(7)  *
1 2
(2 1)( 1) ( 1)
[ ( 1)] ( 1) ( 1) (1 )( 1)
2
zs ns w s ws bbb b
ω γε δ γ γ
εδ γ γ δ γ ω γ ω γ
− −−− −
+−+ − + −+ −−<  
  This example can be related to some of the literature on optimal currency of pricing: 
                                                 
12  There is a second-order conditions for a maximum to be satisfied (see below). 
13     by the second-order condition for profit maximization.  0 ∆>
  10The necessary and sufficient condition derived in Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004) 
for PCP pricing is a special case of this condition when  0 ε =  (so demand is constant elasticity), 
0 δ =  (so the cost function is linear in output),  1 ω =  (so only local inputs are used), and  1 γ > .  
In that case, the condition reduces to 
1
1
2 ws b <  (which corresponds to their Proposition 1.)   
  The necessary and sufficient condition for PCP pricing in the so-called “old-style” partial 
equilibrium model of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002) is also a special case, when the 
exchange rate is the only stochastic variable,  0 ε = ,  1 ω = , and  1 γ > .  In that case, equation (7) 
becomes  1 δγ <  (which corresponds to their Theorem 1.)  The condition for PCP pricing in 
Bachetta and van Wincoop’s more general model can also be interpreted as a special case of 
equation (7).  That model allows for the price of competing goods to covary with the exchange 
rate – that is,  , but still maintains  0 zs b ≠ 0 ε = ,  1 ω = , and  1 γ > .  Under these assumptions, 
equation (7) reduces to  (1 2 ) 1 zs b δγ +< .   
  Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) consider a model in which there are two stages of 
production: exporters sell intermediate goods to final producers, who in turn sell to consumers.  
If the final producers are LCP, then the exporting firm’s problem is a special case of the one 
considered here in which the only stochastic variable is the exchange rate,  0 ε = ,  1 ω = , and 
1 γ > .   (The input for exporters is the wage in the exporting country, and Z is the price of final 
goods.  Z is nonstochastic when final goods producers follow LCP.)  The condition for the 
exporter to price in its own currency is then the special case of equation (7) given by 1 II δ γ <  (as 
in their Theorem 1), where  I δ  measures the curvature of the exporting firm’s production 
function and  I γ  is the elasticity of demand faced by exporters.  If the exporters are PCP, then the 
final goods producers also have a problem that is the same special case.  The input price is the 
  11price of the export good which is priced in the exporter’s currency (so  1 ω = ), and only the 
exchange rate is stochastic.  The condition for LCP pricing is a special case of equation (7): 
1 FF δ γ >  (as in their Theorem 2), but now  F δ  relates to the final goods producers’ technology, 
and  F γ  is the elasticity of demand of final goods consumers.  Bacchetta and van Wincoop then 
conclude there is a Nash equilibrium in which exporters play PCP and final goods producers play 
LCP if  1 II δ γ <  and  1 FF δ γ > . 
Giovannini (1988) finds that the condition for PCP pricing in a partial equilibrium model 
is that the profit function is convex in exchange rates.  His model is the special case in which the 
exchange rate is the only random variable (so the entire left-hand side of the inequality in 
equation (7) is zero) and  1 ω = .  In that case, the condition for PCP pricing reduces to 
(1 )( 1) 0 δγγ ε −− − > , which is precisely the condition that the profit function is convex in the 
exchanger rate.  
  Friberg (1998), like this paper, compares pass-through under flexible prices to conditions 
for PCP vs. LCP when nominal prices are set in advance.  He, like Giovannini (1988), considers 
the special case in which the exchange rate is the only random variable and  1 ω = .  In this case, 










.  Since Friberg assumes  1 γ >  and 
0 δ > , a sufficient condition for the pass-through coefficient ( * p s b − ) to be less than one is  0 ε > .  
An even stronger condition is ε γ > .  Turning to the sticky-price models, under Friberg’s 
assumptions, the condition for firms to choose LCP pricing is (1 )( 1) 0 δγγ ε − −−<.  This 
condition is met when ε γ > .  This is Friberg’s theorem: that when  0 δ >  (and in the confines of 
his set-up in which the exchange rate is the only random variable and  1 ω = ), then a sufficient 
condition for both LCP pricing and a pass-through coefficient less than one is ε γ > .  Friberg 
  12does not fully characterize the conditions for LCP vs. PCP pricing (even in his set-up), and so 
does not arrive at our theorem: a necessary and sufficient condition for LCP pricing is that the 
pass-through coefficient be less than ½. 
  Finally, note the role of distribution costs incurred in the importing country.  If prices are 
set with full information about the exogenous variables affecting profits, then when distribution 
costs are a large share of total costs (when 1 ω −  is close to one) there will be a large elasticity of 
p* with respect to  .  If wages are very stable (have low variance and therefore a low 
covariance with the exchange rate) and 
*
2 w
ω  is close to zero, then the import price will tend to be 
stabilized in the importer’s currency.   That is the result noted by, for example, Goldberg and 
Verboven (2001); Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003); Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 
(2002); and, Goldberg and Campa (2004).  That result says that if distribution costs are 
significant, and those costs are relatively stable in the importer’s currency, then the apparent 
pass-through of the exchange rate to the final goods price will be low. 
  But under these same conditions, LCP will be optimal.  That is, when distribution costs 
are a large share of total costs, and when the wage in the importing cost is stable, it is optimal for 
the exporting firm to set the price in the consumer’s currency. 
  To elaborate on this condition, consider the case in which the production function is CES, 
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In the Cobb-Douglas case ( ) 1 = α , we have  λ ω − = − 1 1 .  In that case, the unconditional pass-
through is lower the larger the share  λ − 1  of foreign inputs into the production process.  That is 
also the case, as the theorem states, in which LCP is more likely.  When foreign and domestic 
  13inputs are combined in fixed proportions (as in the model of Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 















= − .  Under flexible prices, pass-through will be low when the cost of 
distribution services is high and  λ − 1  is large, but again those are also the circumstances in 
which the exporter that invoices prefers LCP. 
  Equation (7) is a general statement of a standard model of pass-through in the 
international trade literature, and suggests empirically testable propositions.  Pass-through should 
be high when equation (7) is satisfied, and low otherwise.  But empirical evidence of this link – 
that, for example, pass-through is low when the distribution share is high, or when demand 
becomes more elastic at higher prices ( 0 ε > ) – does not distinguish whether the flexible-
nominal-price model or the sticky-nominal-price approach is appropriate for macroeconomic 
modeling.  The theorem of this paper shows that both types of models imply high pass-through 
when the condition of equation (7) is met, and low pass-through when it is not.  The work cited 
above finding a link between high distribution shares and low pass-through, or the studies cited 
in Goldberg and Knetter (1997) uncovering a link between variable elasticity of demand and 
pass-through,
14 do not help us draw inferences about the applicability of flex-price vs. sticky-
price models of import pricing. 
  It is worth noting a few precautions in interpreting these results.  First, all of the 
discussion above pertains to the behavior or a single firm taking the economy as given.  Some of 
the papers mentioned cast the firm in a general equilibrium context, but condition (7) takes the 
vector of regression coefficients,  , as given to the firm.  In general equilibrium, these are  xs b
                                                 
14   For example Aw (1993), and Goldberg and Knetter (1998) find such links. 
  14endogenous.  A related point is that the response of aggregate prices to the change in the 
exchange rate is not determined by this condition. 
  Second, these results are derived for a second-order approximation to the profit function.  
In some instances, third or fourth moments may not be small. 
  An obvious limit to the model presented here is that it is static.  There is no claim that the 
equivalence between the conditions for LCS and LCP (or PCS and PCP) carry through to a 
dynamic model.   
  The question of whether nominal prices should be modeled as sticky in a macroeconomic 
model is clearly a dynamic question.  There are very few markets in which goods prices change 
instantly, as they do in asset markets.  But the question that is relevant for macroeconomic 
modeling is whether prices adjust infrequently enough that slow-price adjustment becomes an 
important determinant of business-cycle behavior.  There is no consensus of how infrequently 
prices must adjust before they can be labeled “sticky”.   
  One of the most contentious debates in macroeconomics is whether price stickiness is an 
important feature of the macroeconomy that can explain, for instance, the persistence of output 
or unemployment over the business cycle.  In the open-economy context, some studies have 
asked how infrequent price adjustment must be if slow nominal price adjustment is to explain the 
persistence of deviations from purchasing power parity.  Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) 
demonstrate in one sticky-price model that even when prices are set by firms only annually, the 
persistence of the real exchange rate cannot be matched.  In their data, the first-autocorrelation of 
HP-filtered quarterly real exchange rates for OECD economies is around 0.8, but their model 
produces an autocorrelation of only about 0.6.   But Bergin and Feenstra (2001) have somewhat 
more success in matching real exchange rate persistence in a model with translog preferences 
  15that assumes prices are reset once per year.  Benigno (2004) finds, on the other hand, that real 
exchange rate persistence can be explained in a model with even more frequent price adjustment, 
depending on the interest-rate rule applied by the monetary authorities. 
  The intuition of the result of this paper is that firms prefer to invoice in the importer’s 
currency when their optimal price (if they could observe all factors affecting the pricing decision 
when they set the price) is stable in the importer’s currency.  But whether the local-currency 
price stability that we observe is consistent with a degree of sluggishness that is relevant for 
macroeconomic modeling would require testing a fully dynamic model of price setting that can 
identify the speed of adjustment.
15   
                                                 
15   Marston (1990), Goldberg and Verboven (2005), Choudhri, Faruqee, and Hakura (2003), and Devereux and 
Yetman (2004) are examples of models that attempt to measure the speed of adjustment of prices using micro-based 
models. 
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